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TAX FRAUD AND THE RULE OF LAW 
RITA DE LA FERIA 
 
This article presents a new conceptual framework for research into tax fraud. Informed by research 
approaches from across tax law, public economics, criminology, criminal justice, and regulatory 
theory, its proposed analytical framework assesses the effectiveness, and the legitimacy, of current 
approaches to combating tax fraud. The last decade has witnessed significant intensification of anti-
tax fraud policy within Europe, with an upsurge in both legislative and administrative measures that 
purportedly target tax fraud. Using VAT as a case study, it is argued that these measures display a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the phenomenon of tax fraud, and in particular of the various costs 
it carries, by concentrating upon combating the revenue costs of fraud, rather than the fraud itself. 
Whilst measures deployed to combat revenue costs, and those deployed to combat the tax fraud, 
will often coincide, this will not always be the case. In those cases where they do not coincide 
prevalence is consistently given to enforcement measures addressing revenue costs, rather than 
combatting the fraud itself, even where the effect is to aggravate other costs of tax fraud, such as 
distortions to competition, or tax inequity, or to create an incentive to future non-compliance.  A 
concentration solely upon the revenue costs of fraud can no longer be regarded as either deterrent 
or punishment, but merely as a compensatory mechanism for the lost revenue. These developments 
in anti-tax fraud policy demonstrate a significant shift –one that appears to be motivated by public 
finance concerns– from tax fraud suppression to tax fraud management.  The article concludes that 
this shift not only undermines tax equity and overall tax compliance, but may also lead to selective 
tax enforcement, thus representing a significant risk to the rule of law.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax fraud is, by its very nature, difficult to measure.  Although tax administrations commonly use 
adjustments of unreported activities, these are rarely made public, the methods used vary widely, and 
are often unsuitable.1  No-one doubts, however, its significance, with EU estimates going up to €1 trillion 
                                                        
 Professor in Tax Law, University of Leeds. This paper was the subject of my Inaugural Lecture at the University 
of Leeds (February 2017). In the four years prior, parts therein were also presented at various conferences and 
seminars around Europe, as follows: Bilbao (May 2013), Sofia (February 2014), Riga (June 2014), Trier 
(November 2014), Newcastle (December 2014), Helsinki (February 2015), Lisbon (March 2015), Berlin (May 
2015), Milan (May 2015), Lisbon (June 2015), Warsaw (October 2015), and Munich (June 2017).  I am grateful to 
the organisers and the participants at these events for the comments received therein.  Many specific points were 
also often discussed within social media, and I am grateful to the many tax law and policy experts on Twitter for 
their helpful comments. Finally, I am grateful to Conor O’Reilly for his invaluable suggestions, as well as for initial 
research assistance provided by Radu Petrescu.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 IMF, Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax Compliance, IMF Staff Paper, April 2015, at 10. 
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revenue loss a year.2  In countries, such as the UK, which do publish official aggregate estimates of 
non-compliance, usually designated as the tax gap,3 the estimated revenue lost to fraud runs into the 
many billions of euros.4 Although these measurements cannot be taken to be fully accurate, and the 
gap is a measure of non-compliance, rather than of just revenue loss due to fraud and evasion, the size 
of it is indicative of the scale of the problem.  To the official numbers, recent tax scandals, involving 
evidence of widespread tax fraud, such as the Swiss Leaks,5  and the Panama Papers,6  not only 
presented concrete evidence on its scale,7 but equally it added to public perceptions and awareness of 
the problem. 
Given its significance, it is unsurprising that in the sequence of the economic and financial crisis in 
2008/2009, when EU Member States priorities were first and foremost to ensure fiscal consolidation, 
attention turned more intensively towards tax fraud.  Long a priority in developing countries, the crisis 
ensured that tax compliance also assumed greater priority in advanced and emerging economics,8 such 
as those within the EU. This was particular evident within VAT, given its revenue gathering potential, 
and its perceived limited impact on economic growth.9 
VAT, like any other type of tax, is vulnerable to fraud. Traditionally the inclusion of consumption taxes in 
the tax mix is seen as spreading the risk of enforcement,10 and VAT perceived as less susceptible to 
fraud than its principal alternative, and economically equivalent, the Retail Sales Tax (RST).  This 
comparative advantage is attributable to the multi-stage nature of VAT, which requires the tax to be 
collected on business-to-business transactions, but also allows businesses to credit the VAT paid on 
their purchases (inputs) against the VAT charged on their sales (outputs). This multi-stage collection 
process ensures: (i) that buyers of intermediate goods have opposing interests to the sellers, thus 
reducing the scope for evasion;11 and, (ii) that the risk of evasion is spread across the different elements 
of the production chain. However, whilst the incentive for traders to ensure that suppliers provide them 
                                                        
2  European Commission, Huge sums are being lost due to tax evasion and avoidance, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion/a-huge-problem_en. 
3  On the use of tax gaps and methods to calculate it, see generally OECD, Tax Administration 2017 – 
Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies (OECD Publishing, 2017), 
Chapter 14, 181 et seq. 
4 In the UK the 2016 tax gap is estimated to have been £34 billion, see HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2017: Tax 
gap estimates for 2015-2016, 26 October 2017. 
5 J. Garside et al, “HSBC files show how Swiss bank helped clients dodge taxes and hide millions”, The Guardian, 
8 February 2015. 
6 L. Harding, “What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history's biggest data leak”, The Guardian, 5 April 2016; 
and B. Obermayer and F. Obermaier, Panama Papers: Breaking the Story of How the Rich and Powerful Hide 
Their Money (Oneworld Publications, 2016). 
7 A. Alstadserter et al, “Tax Evasion and Inequality” (2017) NBER Working Paper No. 23772.  See also estimates 
by G. Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens (University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
8 IMF, n. xx above, at 7. 
9 As explained in R. de la Feria, “Blueprint for Reform of VAT Rates in Europe” (2015) Intertax 43(2), 154-171, at 
162. 
10 R. Broadway et al, “Towards a Theory of the Direct–Indirect Tax Mix” (1994) Journal of Public Economics 55(1), 
71-88. 
11 A. Sandmo, “The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View” (2005) National Tax Journal LVIII(4), 643-663, 
at 654. 
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with credit-allowing invoices provides some guarantee that VAT is, to some extent, self-enforceable,12 it 
is also true that this self-enforceability is somewhat illusory.13 Firstly, there is some evidence that “bad 
production chains” can form, particularly in developing countries: where traders are non-compliant they 
tend to give preference to suppliers that are also non-compliant, so as to minimise the amount of input 
tax paid, which may not be deductible.14 Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, even where bad 
chains do not form, self-enforceability does not cover all aspects of the production chain.  This is 
because, the incentive to request an invoice is only present where the acquirer is a business registered 
for VAT purposes, but not where it is a final consumer or a non-registered business, as those 
consumers are not entitled to deduct input VAT; and in addition, even for registered businesses, who 
have the incentive to request the invoice, the incentive does not extend to ensuring that VAT has 
actually been paid, since the invoice is sufficient to prove entitlement to input tax refund.  It is precisely 
at these two moments, when the elements of self-enforceability are absent, that fraud tends to occurs.15 
Whilst concern regarding VAT fraud had been a constant presence within EU countries’ tax 
administrations for many years,16 the last decade has witnessed increasing anxiety about the revenue 
losses that naturally result from it. The exact level of fraud is, by its own nature, difficult to estimate, but 
few would contest its significance.  In 2014 the VAT Gap in the EU, broadly defined as the difference 
between the amount of VAT collected and the total VAT liability, was estimated to be over €16 billion, 
which accounts for 14% of the revenue collected.17 Given the significance of these numbers and of VAT 
to overall tax revenue, 18  it is unsurprising, therefore, that attention turned arguably even more 
intensively towards VAT fraud than to other types of tax fraud.  However, the economic crisis, and 
namely the need to ensure fiscal consolation, seems to have also had the effect of encouraging EU 
Member States to adopt legislation and administrative practices which have concentrated on eliminating 
the revenue costs of fraud, rather than fraud itself.  
                                                        
12 As recently confirmed by D. Pomeranz, “No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in 
the Value Added Tax” (2015) American Economic Review 105(8), 2539-2569. 
13 M. Keen and S. Smith, “VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?” (2006) National 
Tax Journal LIX(4), 861-887. 
14 Empirical evidence of this phenomenon has been found in Brazil, for example, see A. de Paula and J.A. 
Scheinkman, “Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects and Informality” (2010) American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics 2, 195-221. 
15 The first moment, namely the sale to final consumers, is also identified in D. Pomeranz n. xx and in A. Sandmo 
n. xx, but interestingly neither identify the second moment, namely the remittance of collected tax.  
16 Due to what has been designated as a quasi-symbiotic connection between the evolution of the EU VAT system 
and the development of fraud, see C. Tussiot, “La Fraude à la TVA, un Instrument de Modernisation Fiscale”, in C. 
Herbain (ed.), La Fraude à la TVA (Larcier, 2017), at 24. 
17 European Commission, Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2016 Final Report, 
TAXUD/2015/CC/131. 
18 Whilst VAT accounted for over 18% of total tax revenues of EU Member States, in some Member States, such 
as Bulgaria and Hungary, consumption taxes amount to as much 50% of total tax revenue, see European 
Commission, Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2017 Edition, at 20-21, and 159. 
 Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law 4 
The new commitment to combating tax fraud seems, prima facie, to have worked: available estimates 
for developed countries indicate a general narrowing of compliance gaps,19 even within VAT where this 
was not initially the case. In the UK, the overall tax gap has decreased from 7.9% in 2005-2006 to 6% in 
2015-2016, representing £34 billion in revenue; the VAT gap increased slightly between 2011 and 2013, 
but overall there has been a decrease of nearly 4% between 2005 and 2016, from 13.6% to 9.8%.20  
This decrease has not been unanimously welcomed.  It has been argued that measures which reduce 
the gap may also have a long-term negative effects on revenue and general welfare, where a business 
activity is worth undertaking if the associate tax paid is below that due, but not if tax is fully paid.21  Such 
criticisms assume, however, that the decrease in the tax gap results from increased compliance by 
fraudsters, and that is indeed also the official explanation by tax administrations. Yet, recent 
developments indicate that this may not be (fully) the case.  Whilst some concerns have been raised 
about potential distortions in this area, for example, on the effect of over-payments in the gap level, or 
the incentive to concentrate efforts on compliant taxpayers, 22  there seems to be a widely held 
assumption that a reduction in the gap represents a reduction in fraud levels. This is, however, a false 
equivalence. 
Tax amnesties allow tax fraudsters to voluntarily repay all or parts of unpaid taxes without being subject 
to criminal prosecutions or full penalties.  Although they have been present within the policy sphere 
since the 1980s,23 they have become particularly popular in the last few years, since the financial crisis, 
due to budgetary pressures.24  Policy makers often view amnesties as an efficient method of obtaining 
additional revenue, but beyond empirical evidence showing that their financial success varies widely 
and cannot be guarantee, 25  they raise some fundamental concerns.  Whilst tax amnesties may 
eliminate the revenue costs of the fraud, it does not address fraud itself: indeed there is strong empirical 
evidence that the lack of punishment creates a moral hazard which negatively impacts on tax 
compliance, increasing the incidents of fraud. 26   Yet tax amnesties are far from being the only 
manifestation of a new approach on anti-fraud policy, which prioritises short-term revenue benefits over 
long-term increases in tax compliance. Rather they are symptomatic of a much wider trend which has 
been particularly evident in VAT, whereby the decrease in the gap may be partly attributed not to the 
                                                        
19 IMF, n. xx above, at 13. 
20 HMRC, Measuring tax gaps 2017: Tax gap estimates for 2015-2016, 26 October 2017. 
21 N. Gemmel and J. Hasseltdine, “Taxpayer’s Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: 
A Critique and a New Measure” (2014) Fiscal Studies 35, 275-296. 
22 IMF, n. xx above, at 7 and 13. 
23 A. Malik, “The Economics of Tax Amnesties” (1991) Journal of Public Economics 46, 29-49; H.B. Leonard and 
R.J. Zeckhauser, “Amnesty, Enforcement and Tax Policy” in L. Summers (ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy (MIT 
Press, 1987), 55-86. 
24 R.C. Bayer et al, “The Occurrence of Tax Amnesties: Theory and evidence” (2015) Journal of Public Economics 
125, 70-82. 
25 J. Hasseltine, “Tax Amnesties: An International Review” (1998) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
52(7), 303-310; and K. Baer and E. Le Borge, Tax Amnesties: Theory, Trends, and Some Alternatives 
(Washington DC: IMF, 2008). 
26 See in particular R.C. Bayer et al, n. xx above. See also A Malik, n. xx above; and B. Torgler and C.A. “Tax 
Amnesties and Political Participation” (2005) Public Finance Review 33(3), 403-431. 
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reduction of fraud, but to the implementation of measures designed to collect revenue from non-
fraudulent businesses, so as to compensate that lost through fraud.  Moreover, whilst these practices 
represent a massive shift in the approach to tax law enforcement, they are reminiscent of current trends 
in other crime control in criminal justice systems in developed Western societies.27 
The aim of this paper is to reflect upon both the effectiveness, and the legitimacy, of these practices. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section Two begins by presenting a new 
conceptual framework of tax fraud, using VAT as a case study; it presents a broad typology of VAT 
fraud, and it considers the various costs of tax fraud. In Section Three existing measures to tackle tax 
evasion resulting from informality are discussed, namely the increase in the levels of penalties’ and a 
formalistic approach to compliance. In Section Four attention shifts to measures adopted to combat 
organised tax fraud, and in particular, developments such as third-party tax liability will be considered in 
terms of similar criminal justice approaches, most notably trends towards responsibilisation of crime 
control, and asset confiscation. In this Section, the notion of aggravated responsibilisation is presented, 
as part of a proposed reconceptualised of the phenomenon of responsibilisation in the context of tax 
fraud.  Section Five concludes by considering the risks that this policy shift from tax fraud suppression 
to tax fraud management present, both in terms of the potential creation of a moral hazard that may 
further lead to the further propagation of tax fraud, but crucially also through the establishment of 
selective tax enforcement which undermines the rule of law. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE TAX FRAUD PHENOMENON 
VAT fraud can be defined as behaviour aimed at obtaining an unlawful VAT advantage and/or causing 
unlawful VAT loss.28  Although the means of obtaining such advantage vary greatly, as do the potential 
costs resulting from the fraud (beyond obvious revenue loss), there is often a failure to grasp the 
complexity of the phenomenon. In particular, revenue loss is often perceived to be the only cost of 
fraud.29 This lack of understanding is reflected in the measures adopted to combat this phenomenon. 
Understanding the phenomenon of VAT fraud phenomenon is therefore a necessary preliminary step 
towards critical assessment of measures to address it. 
A Typology of VAT Fraud 
There have been a number of attempts to provide a typology of VAT fraud. Some have focussed on the 
distinction between those types of fraud that are common to all taxes, and those that are specific to VAT 
(or other consumption taxes),30 whilst others have concentrated on the differences between the types of 
                                                        
27 See discussion below in Section IV. 
28 For a definition of fraud more generally see M. Levi and J. Burrows, “Measuring the Impact of Fraud in the UK” 
(2008) British Journal of Criminology 48(3), 293-318. 
29 This seems to be the approach adopted in the UK, see UK National Audit Office, Tackling Tax Fraud: How 
HMRC responds to tax evasion, the hidden economy, and criminal attacks, HC 610, Session 2015-2016, 17 
December 2015. 
30 M. Keen and S. Smith, n. xx above. 
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perpetrators,31and others yet have concentrated on the chronology of types, and their changes over 
time.32 Given the constant mutations in behavioural patterns, providing a definitive typology of VAT is, 
by its nature, difficult. However, it is argued that the main distinction is that between evasion and 
organised fraud. Although this distinction does connect with the type of perpetrator, its primary focus is 
on the means used to obtain an unlawful tax advantage. Evasion results from, what is commonly 
designated as, informality, and it can be defined as the deliberate omission, concealment or 
misrepresentation of information to reduce VAT liability. Organised fraud, on the other hand, involves 
coordinated and systematic actions, with varying levels of sophistication and organisation towards 
obtaining a VAT financial advantage. These two behavioural types are also characterised by divergent 
characteristics in terms of perpetrators, geographical reach, methods, and costs. Evasion tends to be 
carried out by small companies, 33  operating at national level –although no longer exclusively so, 
particularly as a result of the digitalisation of the economy– who take advantage of national 
administrative limitations and distinctions in the tax base. Organised fraud tends to be carried out by 
criminal gangs, operating at a trans-border level, who take advantage of tax authorities’ enforcement 
limitations regarding cross-border trade; in particular lack of real-time information exchange between 
different tax authorities. These two categories of VAT fraud also give rise to different types of costs 
(further discussed below): organised fraud tends to result in higher levels of revenue loss and a subsidy 
to organised crime networks; whilst, evasion tends to have a bigger impact upon taxpayer inequity and 
creates an uneven playing-field. These distinctions are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: VAT Evasion vs Organised Fraud 
 EVASION ORGANISED FRAUD 
Definition Results from informality 
Deliberate omission, concealment or 
misrepresentation of information to 
reduce VAT liability 
Coordinated and systematic actions, with 
varying levels of sophisticated and 
organisation, with the aim of obtaining a 
VAT financial advantage 
Type of 
Perpetrators 
Primarily small companies Carried out largely by criminal gangs 
Geographical 
Reach 
Traditionally operating at national level, 
although spreading as a result of the 
digitalisation of the economy  
Operating primarily at borders 
Method Take advantage of national administrative 
limitations, and distinctions in the tax 
base 
Take advantage of enforcement limitations 
by tax administrations on cross-border 
trade 
                                                        
31 This is the case of HMRC, which divide fraud into three types: that perpetrated by registered businesses who 
conceal or omit information (evasion); that carried out by non-registered individuals (hidden economy); and that 
carried out by criminal gangs (criminal attacks), see UK National Audit Office, n. xx. 
32 M. Lamensch, “Fraude TVA et Commerce Digital” in C. Herbain (ed.), La Fraude à la TVA (Larcier, 2017), 127-
145. 
33 UK National Audit Office, n. xx.  On the impact of firm size on evasion, see D. Pomeranz n. xx; and H.J. Kleven, 
C.T. Kreiner, and E. Saez, “Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms As Fiscal 
Intermediaries” (2016) Economica 83(330), 219-246;  
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Type of Costs Primarily taxpayer equity and level 
playing field 
Primarily revenue loss, subsidy to 
organised crime, compliance and 
administrative costs 
 
Both evasion and organised fraud can be further subdivided into various sub-types, as set out in 
Diagram 1. It should be noted that these types/sub-types, are indicative rather than rigidly distinct: there 
are reports of hybrid fraud, which combines evasion (under-reporting of sales) with organised fraud 
(bogus traders / invoices).34  
Diagram 1: Typology of VAT Fraud 
 
Under-reported sales happen where a trader reports only a proportion of sales, falsifying 
records/accounts, or keeping sales off-the-books by not issuing invoices. With modern accounting 
software programmes, this type of evasion has evolved from destruction or falsification of accounting 
documents to much more complex systems that are harder to track. In cases where software – 
automated sales suppression systems, colloquially referred to as zappers – is connected to a cash 
register system, these programmes are able to change the entire chain, adjust stock records and 
recorded employees’ work time. Some programmes are even able to alter accounting entrances for 
official purposes, whilst keeping accurate buyers’ invoices.  Recent versions of these software 
programmes operate on the basis of a foreign (or extra-jurisdictional) zapper that is provided to users 
over the internet. These alter domestic records from a distance with minimum risk for both the 
programme and the developer.35  The growth of the digital economy, and in particular online sales, has 
further increased the risks of under-reporting, as it is difficult for tax administrations to know when and 
                                                        
34 K.V. Pashev, “Countering cross-border VAT fraud: the Bulgarian experience” (2007) Journal of Financial Crime 
14(4), 490-501. 
35 For a comprehensive explanation of the fascinating world of zappers, see R.T. Ainsworth, “Zappers – Retail 
VAT Fraud” (2010) International VAT Monitor 3, 175-182.  See also R.T. Ainsworth, “California Zappers: A 
proposal for California’s Commission on the 21st Century Economy” (2009) Boston University School of Law 
Working Paper 09-01, January 2009. 
V
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Undue refund claims 
Organised Fraud 
Bogus traders / 
invoices 
VAT collected, not 
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where a sale has been made.36  Like failure to register, this type of evasion is traditionally more 
common in firms primarily engaging in B2C sales. 
Failure to register occurs most often, albeit not exclusively, when small businesses have annual 
turnovers just above the registration threshold. This type of evasion is most common where businesses 
sell to final consumers (B2C), since they do not have an incentive to request invoices. It is also common 
in labour-intensive areas with little or no input VAT (such as hairdressing, plumbing or electric repairs); 
since non-registered traders are not able to deduct input VAT.37  Evidence of this type of evasion is 
demonstrated by the strong bunching up of firms just below the VAT threshold.38 
Evasion by misclassification of sales occurs where traders reduce their liability by exaggerating the 
proportion of sales in products subject to reduced rates of VAT. This type of fraud is most likely where 
reduced rates apply, since these grant the right to deduct VAT whilst exemptions do not, which is the 
case in all EU Member States,39 and indeed in most countries around the world, with the notable 
exclusion of New Zealand. 
Evasion through undue refund claims for VAT may occur in one of two ways. The first involves a 
partially-exempt trader, supplying both taxable and exempt outputs; in this case there is an incentive to 
allocate inputs to the taxable portion of outputs so as to claim refunds. The second way, which is 
particularly common, consists of misrepresentation of items, such as a home computer or a car, bought 
for private consumption as business inputs, allowing for VAT input recovery. 
Bogus traders are companies that may be set up solely for the purpose of selling invoices that allow 
recovery of VAT, or “invoice mills” for short; bogus invoices can also be sold by otherwise legitimate 
businesses. This fraud exploits the practical impossibility for tax administrations of cross-checking 
whether every transaction evidence by the invoice did actually occur.  In it, the underlying sale of goods 
or services never took place, and the actual sale is that of the invoice giving the right to deduct VAT. 
The fraud is therefore exclusive to B2B transactions, and requires collusion between seller and 
purchaser, as well as a significant level of organisation.  Current levels of litigation concerning alleged 
bogus traders seems to indicate high levels of this type of fraud, primarily in Eastern European Member 
States.40 
The final type of fraud is that resulting from VAT collected but not remitted to the Government. Whilst 
there are various possible methods to commit this type of fraud – such as false accounting, or 
engineering bankruptcy after collecting the tax but before it is remitted – the most important is 
                                                        
36 IMF, n. xx 2015 above, at 30. 
37 B. Lockwood and L. Liu, “VAT Notches, Voluntary Registration, and Bunching: Theory and UK Evidence” (2016) 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Papers, WP 16/10. 
38 Source B. Lockwood and L. Liu, n. xx. 
39 R. de la Feria, (2015) n. xx above. 
40  Cases C-527/11, Ablessio, ECLI:EU:C:2013:168 (Latvia); C-78/12, Evita-K, ECLI:EU:C:2013 (Bulgaria); C-
18/13, Maks Pen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:69 (Bulgaria); C-107/13, FIRIN, ECLI:EU:C:2014:151 (Bulgaria). 
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undoubtedly the so-called carousel fraud, or missing-trader fraud (MTF).  EU legislation (no longer in 
force) has previously defined a missing trader as: 
“…a trader registered as a taxable person for VAT purposes who, potentially with a fraudulent intent, 
acquires or purports to acquire goods or services without payment of VAT and supplies these goods 
or services with VAT, but does not remit the VAT due to the appropriate national authority”. 41 
This fraud exploits two key features of the VAT system: the time gap between the collection of the tax 
and its remittance; and the destination principle, which requires all exports to be VAT-free, with the tax 
collected solely on imports. In its simplest form, a trader – the MFT – collects VAT paid to him by a 
supplier without accounting or remitting to the tax authorities, disappearing soon after, and before the 
authorities realise what has occurred.42 There are numerous variations to this basic model: the same 
goods may move around different chains continuously, with all the traders in the chain involved, or at 
least aware that the fraud is occurring (carousel fraud); or different goods are sold by fraudsters to 
unsuspecting third parties, inserting themselves into legitimate production chains (MTF). A more recent 
version of the MTF is reportedly the insolvent trader, in which instead of a missing trader, the scheme 
includes an existing firm, which is stripped of any assets before the tax authorities reach it. 
A diagrammatic example of these basic types is shown below.  Whilst these fraud schemes had 
traditionally operated within the EU, similar schemes have now developed involving third countries, 
taking advantage of VAT rules on imports.43  
Diagram 2: How Missing Trader Fraud Works 
 
A makes an intra-EU supply to B. As such, he does not charge VAT, but deducts related input VAT. B supplies the 
goods to C, who is taxable person in the same Member State. He charges VAT to C. B is supposed to account for 
VAT on both the intra-EU acquisition from A and the supply to C, but does neither. He deducts any input VAT, 
which he might have, and before the tax authorities realise his failure to account for output VAT, B disappears. C 
sells the goods back to A (carrousel fraud), or to D (MTF). 
Whilst evasion has been receiving growing attention over the last few years, MTF has been the main 
focus of EU institutional attention since the late 1990s.  This is partially due to the scale and organised 
nature of the MTF, which often requires EU coordinated action, but also the fact that evasion was for a 
                                                        
41 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1925/2004 of 29 October, OJ L 331, 05/11/2004, 13-18. 
42 Case C-354/03 Optigen and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2005:89, para. 8. 
43 F. Borselli, ”Pragmatic Policies to Tackle VAT Fraud in the European Union” (2008) International VAT Monitor 5, 
333-342. 
A 
(Member State 1) 
B 
(Member State 2) 
C 
(Member State 2) 
D 
(Member State 2) 
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long time perceived as a domestic-only problem, whilst MTF is to a large extent a direct consequence of 
arrangements put in place in 1993 for intra-EU trade, as a consequence of the abolition of physical 
frontiers within the EU. 
Costs of Tax Fraud 
Measuring the costs of fraud, like measuring its level is, by its nature, difficult.44  As regards tax fraud, 
the two are intrinsically linked, and calculation of revenue losses is generally used as the basis to 
estimate the level of fraud.45 Insofar as VAT is concerned, since 2004, it has often been asserted that 
fraud accounts for approximately 10% of VAT revenue within the EU;46 more recently, however, the 
measure most commonly used by the European Commission is the VAT Gap.  Whilst in 2014 the VAT 
Gap within the EU was estimated to be 14% of revenue,47 since the GAP is a measure of compliance 
and enforcement, and not just fraud, the revenue costs attributable to the latter should be taken to be 
considerably smaller.  Similarly in the UK, whilst HMRC has estimated the VAT GAP to be at 9.8% of 
total revenue for 2015-2016,48 no estimates are offered for overall VAT fraud, although some types of 
fraud are quantified, such as MTF, estimated to be 0.5% of total revenue.49  Total tax fraud – not just 
VAT – is estimated to be 3% of revenue for the same period. 50 Europol has also offered estimates for 
MTF, reporting that EU countries lose €100 billion annually to that one type of fraud; a perhaps all too 
convenient figure but certainly one that symbolises the significance of the problem.51 
Whilst the above are, of course, mere estimates –and methodological difficulties are openly 
acknowledged by tax administrations– and the lack of comparable data regarding VAT fraud across the 
EU has been identified as a significant limitation to understanding of the phenomenon,52 it is reasonable 
to assume that the share of revenue lost within EU to VAT fraud is quite considerable.  This is also 
supported by evidence on the increased scale of fraud, with some individual instances of fraud so 
massive as to account in isolation for a significant amount of revenue loss. In this regard, one of the 
most infamous cases was the so-called CO2 fraud, a missing trader fraud in the Emissions Trading 
System, which in the 18 months that it lasted – between 2008 and 2009 – is said to have resulted in 
                                                        
44 M. Levi and J. Burrows, n. xx above. 
45 For a review of the literature on measurements of VAT fraud see L. Barbone et al, The Costs of VAT: A Review 
of the Literature, CASE Network No. 106/2012, at 46 et seq; see also C.W. Nam et al, “Measurement of Value 
Added Tax Evasion in Selected EU Countries on the Basis of National Accounts Data” (2001) CESifo Working 
Papers 431, March 2001. 
46 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the use of 
administrative cooperation arrangements in the fight against VAT fraud, COM(2004) 260 final, 16 April 2004, at 5. 
47 See above. 
48 HMRC, n. xx above. 
49 HMRC, n. xx above. 
50 UK National Audit Office, n. xx above. 
51 Europol, EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment, SOCTA 2013. 
52 European Court of Auditors, Tackling intra-Community VAT fraud: More action needed, Special Report No. 24, 
2015. 
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losses of approximately 5 billion euros for several national tax revenues;53 several other instances of 
massive fraud have more reported in the media.54 
These estimates also highlight the extent to which measuring VAT fraud has been equated with 
measuring the revenue costs of VAT fraud. Whilst this is a natural approach, given the difficulties in 
measuring fraud directly, it also gives rise to the common misconception that the only costs of VAT 
fraud are revenue costs.  Despite some institutions, such as the European Commission or the IMF, 
having on occasion, acknowledged the existence of other costs beyond lost revenue,55 it is clear that 
the focus in reports concerning VAT fraud is largely on the revenue loss element.  Yet, like other types 
of fraud, that loss – or transfer costs – in VAT fraud is but one of the problems associated with it. 
Generally fraud costs can be disaggregated into various components, namely costs of preventing fraud 
(anticipatory costs), costs of responding to fraud, and negative externalities.56 All are evident in VAT, 
and more broadly, on tax fraud.  Apart from the revenue loss, and as demonstrated in Diagram 4, tax 
fraud gives rise to significant compliance and administrative costs for both tax administrations and for 
businesses, and significant negative externalities, namely distortions to competition, taxpayer inequity, 
and subsidies to organised crime.  Some of these are new resource costs, rather than transfer costs, 
which has detrimental effects on economic welfare.57 
Diagram 4: The Costs of Tax Fraud 
                                                        
53 Europol Press Release, Carbon Credit fraud causes more than 5 billion euros damage for European Taxpayer, 
December 9, 2009.  For detailed accounts and effects of this instance of fraud, see P. Efstratios, “Halting the 
Horses: EU Policy on the VAT Carousel Fraud in the EU Emissions Trading System” (2012) EC Tax Review 1, 39-
51; R.A. Wolf, “A Sad History of Carbon Carousels” (2010) International VAT Monitor 21(6); M. Berrittella and F.A. 
Cimino, “The Carousel Value-Added Tax Fraud in the European Emission Trading System” (2012) Fondaziona Eni 
Enrico Mattei Nota di Lavoro 75.2012; R.T. Ainsworth, “CO2 MTIC Fraud – Technologically Exploiting the EU VAT 
(Again)” (2010) Boston University School of Law Working Paper 10-01, January 2010; and R.T. Ainsworth, “The 
Morphing of MTIC Fraud: VAT Fraud Infects Tradable CO2 Permits” (2009) Boston University School of Law 
Working Paper 09-35, August 2009. 
54 Eurojust EU-wide fuel oil and precious metals VAT fraud and money laundering network dismantled, Press 
Release, 21 December 2016; Europol, Eight Member States take action against international VAT fraud, Press 
Release, 29 June 2016. See also media reports: J. Oliver, “On the run: the plumber who worked a £15m VAT 
fraud”, The Guardian, 4 March 2005; J. Oliver, “Scams steal £8.4bn from taxpayer”, BBC One Panorama, 2006; J. 
Moncur, “Father and son fraudsters who made off with £109m in ill-gotten gains are tracked to African bolthole”, 
Mirror, 4 April 2016. 
55 As the Commission stated in 2004: “In addition to the loss of national revenue, this fraud jeopardises legitimate 
trade in certain economic sectors and distorts competition to the benefit of dishonest traders.” in n. xx above, 
COM(2004) 260 final, 5. See also IMF, n. xx 2015 above, at 7 
56 M. Levi and J. Burrows, n. xx above. 
57 M. Feldstein, “Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of income” (1999) Review of Economics and Statistics 
81, 674-680; and R. Chetty, “Is the taxable income elasticity sufficient to calculate deadweight loss? The 
implications of evasion and avoidance” (2009) American Economic Review: Economic Policy 1, 31-52. 
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Tax fraud can also impose significant costs upon legitimate traders by creating distortions to 
competition. A lobby group set up by UK-based SMEs has been drawing attention to the distortive 
problems caused by alleged VAT fraud perpetrated online by non-EU traders,58 and research does 
seem to substantiate these anedoctal reports.  Economic models indicate that tax-evading firms are 
likely to drive non-evading ones out of the market;59 and although there are few studies showing 
empirical evidence of this impact, the few that do exist confirm that this impact can be significant for 
affected industries.60  The impact is also likely to affect SMEs more strongly than bigger firms, as the 
latter’s cash-flow levels allows them to better respond to these distortive effects. There is also evidence 
that fraud results in less frequent trade and lower quality trade in affected industries, as non-evading 
firms refrain from engaging in trade or divert trade, where they suspect that businesses are involved in 
tax fraud.61  Designated by authors as fraud’s hidden costs, the research seems to again confirm 
reports suggesting that bigger businesses are now refraining from trading with SMEs, for fear of being 
inadvertently involved in VAT fraud.  It also indicates the potential presence of other distortive effects to 
fraud, and particularly to evasion, that have not yet been measured or identified.62 
                                                        
58 Campaign Against VAT Fraud on eBay & Amazon in the UK, available at: www.vatfraud.org. 
59 J. Strand, “Tax distortions, household production, and black-market work” (2005) European Journal of Political 
Economy 21, 851-871. 
60 M.C. Frunza et al consider the impact of VAT fraud on the European carbon allowances markets between 2008 
and 2009, and find it to have been extremely significant on the markets’ overall performance and its volatility, see 
M.C. Frunza et al, “Missing trader fraud on the emissions market” (2011) Journal of Financial Crime 18(2), 183-
194. 
61 L. Boulafoutas et al, “The Hidden Costs of Tax Evasion – Collaborative Tax Evasion in the Markets for Expert 
Services” (2015) Journal of Public Economics 129, 14-25. 
62 Ibid. 
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Directly connected with the distortive costs of tax fraud, are its effects on taxpayer equity. Tax equity is 
one of the key taxation principles, and it is usually divided into horizontal equity and vertical equity.63  
Tax fraud tends to undermine vertical equity, and thus result in a more regressive tax system,64 as in 
the absence of a counteracting effect of tax morality,65 those with higher incomes are more likely to be 
able to engage in fraud.66 Whilst there is an ongoing debate on the role of vertical tax equity concerns 
within consumption taxes,67 tax equity, in its horizontal dimension, which demands that similarly situated 
taxpayers face similar tax burdens, is a key principle of VAT, as it is of any tax. 68  Violations of 
horizontal tax equity are therefore regarded as serious flaws in any tax arrangement.69 Tax fraud, by 
definition, introduces an element of horizontal tax inequity into the tax system, insofar as it results in 
similarly situated taxpayers facing dissimilar tax burdens.  In the case of consumption taxes, such as 
VAT, how that element is felt and by whom may vary, depending on the type and circumstances of the 
fraud.  Assuming that the incidence of these taxes falls on consumers as taxpayers,70 inequality can 
arise amongst consumers. Where fraudulent businesses charge less tax, and thus a lower price, than 
non-fraudulent business, in order to obtain a competitive advantage inequality may also arise. However, 
amongst collectors of consumptions taxes, namely businesses in charge of remitting the tax, where tax 
is charged to consumers equally by all businesses, but fraudulent ones fail to remit it to tax 
administrations, they also obtain a financial advantage.  In between these two poles there are many 
hybrid situations, where tax inequality arises amongst both consumers and businesses – e.g. where 
fraudulent business charge only part of the tax due to consumers, but fail to remit any to tax authorities.  
That VAT fraud creates horizontal tax inequity is not only relevant in its own right, but equally because 
there is strong evidence that perceptions of tax equity impact upon compliance levels.71  In particular, 
tax inequity undermines what has been designated as tax moral thinking: taxpayers’ self-regulatory 
mechanism that cognitively frames paying taxes as doing “the right thing”.72  Where there is perceived 
                                                        
63 Whilst the concept of vertical tax equity goes back centuries, the concept of horizontal tax equity seems to have 
been first identified only more recently, in H.C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (University of Chicago Press, 
1938).  See D. Elkins, “Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory” (2006) Yale Law and Policy Review 24, 43-
90. 
64 J. Slemrod and S. Yitzhaki, “Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration” in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein 
(eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3 (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2002), 1423-1470. 
65 K. Lee, “Morality, tax evasion and equity” (2016) Mathematical Social Sciences 82, 97-102. 
66 As recently demonstrated by A. Alstadserter et al, n. xx above. 
67 R. de la Feria, n. xx 2015 above. 
68 Although this assertion is not universally accepted, see L. Kaplow, “Horizontal Equity: New Measures, Unclear 
Principles” in Hasset and Hubbard (eds.), Inequality and Tax Policy (American Enterprise Institute, 2001). 
69 D. Elkins, n. xx above, at 44. 
70 Which is far from clear, and will often depend on market circumstances, see R. de la Feria, n. xx 2015 above. 
71 For a summary of research in this area see J. Slemrod, “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion” 
(2007) Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(1), 25-48, at 38 et seq; see also D. Onu and L. Oats, “The Role of 
Social Norms in Tax Compliance: Theoretical Overview and Practical Implications” (2015) Journal of Tax 
Administration 1(1). 
72 V. Braithwaite, Defiance in Taxation and Governance – Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy 
(Edward Elgar, 2009), at 148-158. 
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tax inequity, taxpayers are less likely to think morally, and can respond to taxation through defiance,73 
as the sense of fairness of the tax system is important for general tax compliance. 74   Recent 
experiments using behavioural science, undertaken by the tax authorities in the UK, have confirmed 
previous empirical studies in this regard.75 
The connection between organised crime and organised tax fraud, and its use as a financing method for 
illegal activities, have been acknowledged by EU institutions,76 and are a common feature of media 
reports.77  Whilst this connection is not exclusive to missing trader fraud, and there are reports of other 
types of VAT fraud perpetrated by organised crime networks,78 that particular type of fraud seems to be 
a particularly attractive source of financing for organised crime groups. Although official 
acknowledgment of such links may be recent, its existence has been described in criminological 
research since the early 1990s.79  Previous experience in the Benelux countries with the Postpone 
Accounting System (PAS) – the inspiration for the intra-EU VAT system that applied from 1993 onwards 
–80 had already indicated that the system was susceptible to fraud;81 and in the late 1980s and early 
1990s research alerted to the possibility that intra-EU VAT fraud was about to establish itself in the form 
of crime networks.  The problem is said to have been brought to the attention of the then Director-
General of the European Commission’s Internal Market, who is said to have remarked indifferently that 
this form of organised cross-border crime was not the Commission's problem. 82   This implies a 
willingness to accept the creation of a permissive environment for fraud, for fear of undermining the 
positive case for European integration, or the belief that the costs of fraud could be set against the 
                                                        
73 Ibid, at 200.  See also V. Braithwaite, “Tax Evasion” in M. Tonry, (ed.), Handbook on Crime and Public Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 381-405, at 384. 
74 H. Filipczyk, Tax Avoidance and Rationality of Law (Wolters Kluwer, 2017), at 357-358. 
75 D. Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit – How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference (WH Allen, 2015), at 112-
115. 
76 European Court of Auditors, n. xx above; Europol, n. xx above; and Europol, Eight Member States take action 
against international VAT fraud, Press Release, 29 June 2016. See also HM Government, Serious and Organised 
Crime Strategy, October 2013; and Center for the Study of Democracy, Financing of Organised Crime, 2015, at 61 
et seq. 
77 S. O'Driscoll, “Man who paid dissident's bail ran Northern Ireland's biggest ever money-laundering scam”, 
Belfast Telegraph, 28 April 2017; H. McDonald, “Fourteen held in largest ever Northern Ireland anti-fraud 
operation”, The Guardian, 13 March 2013; S. Rayment. “Northern Ireland: The new war on terror”, The Telegraph, 
14 March 2009; and A. Travis and A. Seager, “Reid wants Europe to fight VAT fraud linked to terror funds”, The 
Guardian, 26 October 2006. 
78 J. Ware, “Stakeknife: Spy linked to 18 murders, BBC Panorama finds”, BBC News, 12 April 2017. 
79 P. van Duyne, “VAT Fraud and the Policy of Global Ignorance” (1999) European Journal of Law Reform 1, 425-
443. See also S White, “VAT revenue and organised crime: time for action?” (1999) European Law Review 24(4), 
433-439. 
80 For a review of the process that led to the introduction of a transitional VAT system, based on the PAS see R. 
de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), at 68 et seq. On the 
connection between PAS and fraud see Y. Fedchyshyn, “Postponed Accounting in the European Union” (2014) 
International VAT Monitor 1, 11-15. 
81 R. Wolf, “The Sad History of Carbon Carousels” (2010) International VAT Monitor 6, 403; C. Amand and K. 
Boucquez, “A New Defense for Victims of EU Missing-Trader Fraud?” (2011) International VAT Monitor 4, 234, 
236. 
82 See the remarkable account by P. van Duyne, “VAT Fraud and the Policy of Global Ignorance” (1999) European 
Journal of Law Reform 1, 425-443, at 434. 
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overall benefits of that integration. Whether this is an accurate account of events or not, tax 
administrations had indeed been pointing out that the system was susceptible to fraud since its 
inception in 1993.  According to field experts, the feared flow of mega frauds did not emerge 
immediately after 1 January 1993; instead criminal activity is said to have started 18 to 24 months later: 
at first so-called veterans tested the system and how easy it was to cash the VAT by making a few 
loops across the border; these were then followed by some legitimate traders; 83  and finally the 
'legitimate' and 'criminal' entrepreneurs started to cooperate.84 
Compliance and administrative costs are mostly second order costs, resulting not from fraud itself, but 
its spread across various entities, and at various moments. For non-fraudulent businesses and for tax 
administrations, there are two main type of costs, namely: anticipatory costs, where those entities take 
measures to prevent involvement in fraud (businesses) or deter fraud (tax administrations), such as 
implementation of new software or due diligence; and reactive costs, where fraud has taken place, and 
costs arise in the context of inadvertently engaging with fraudsters (businesses), or pursing civil or 
criminal remedies against fraudsters (tax administrations).85  There is evidence, however, that evasion 
in particular also gives rise to resource costs for fraudsters, as they try to conceal the fraud,86 or in the 
case of risk-averse fraudsters, as a result of the uncertainty that engaging in fraud creates.87 
Although the above costs of tax fraud are significant, and often nominally recognised,88 as the analysis 
below demonstrates, they seemed to have been to a large extent ignored in the context of anti-fraud 
policy. 
III. TACKLING TAX EVASION 
The policy to tackle tax evasion resulting from informality has traditionally been relatively 
unsophisticated, relying primarily on penalties, surcharges and other administrative and criminal 
sanctions.  Despite attracting significant academic attention,89  there was a sense that, from a tax 
administration perspective, further investment in tackling evasion may have been perceived as 
inefficient, as the difficulties in implementing and the human resources costs involved in adopting a 
stricter approach, such as audits, outweighed the potential revenue benefits.  The last decade, 
however, has seen a massive shift in this approach, with increased attention being paid to anti-evasion 
                                                        
83 For example, one of the biggest meat trader in the Netherlands, see P.C. van Duyne, “Organized Crime, 
Corruption and Power” (1997) Crime, Law and Social Change 26, 201-238. 
84 For criminological research into intra-EU VAT fraud, including discussion on the parasitic relationship between 
legitimate and organised crime traders, and their modus operandi, see A. Aronowitz et al, Value-Added Tax Fraud 
in the European Union (Amsterdam: Kugler Publications 1996). 
85 M. Levi and J. Burrows, n. xx above. 
86 R.C. Bayer, “A contest with the taxman – the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested 
resources” (2006) European Economic Review 50, 1071-1104. 
87 S. Yitzhaki, “A note on optimal taxation and administrative costs” (1979) American Economic Review 69, 475-
480. 
88 See references in n. xx above. 
89 The initial work on tax compliance dates back to the early 1970s; see landmark work by M.G. Allingham and S. 
Sandmo, “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis” (1972) Journal of Public Economics 1(2-3), 323-338. 
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policy.  This shift has undoubtedly been due in part to promising developments in behavioural science –
from responsive regulation to nudge theories–90 as well as the use of new technologies,91 to encourage 
tax compliance, both of which allow a stricter approach to enforcement, at lower costs than traditional 
methods.  Although these are clearly positive developments, and initial results concerning the (still) 
geographically limited use of these scientific and technological methods of tax enforcement are 
extremely encouraging, the wider picture on anti-evasion policy gives is not as inspiring. 
From the mid-2000s onwards VAT anti-evasion policy has been primarily characterised by a toughening 
of compliance regimes in several EU Member States, with the adoption of increased penalties, interest, 
and other sanctions, as well as a stricter, formalistic, approach to tax compliance obligations.  Even 
where new approaches, such as the use of behavioural science and of new technologies, have been 
implemented, they have been accompanied by renewed reliance on traditional negative incentives to 
ensure compliance.92  These new legislative and administrative compliance measures have given rise 
to significant litigation at CJEU level,93 some of which concerns allegations of violation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.94  This highlights the severity of both the new practices and 
the legal concerns that they give rise to.  As the analysis below lays bare, the judgments in those cases 
not only confirm the legitimacy of these concerns, with the Court siding in the large majority of cases 
with the taxpayer, but they are also further demonstrate a prioritisation in anti-evasion policy of 
combating the revenue costs of fraud, over combating fraud itself. 
Penalties, Interest and Other Negative Compliance Incentives 
                                                        
90 On the use of responsive regulation in tax, see J. Freedman, Responsive Regulation, Risk, and the Rules: 
Applying the Theory to Tax Practice” (2012) University of British Columbia Law Review 44, 627; and the influential 
work by I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the De-Regulation Debate (Oxford 
University Press, 1992). On the use of nudges in tax see D. Halpern, n. xx above. For an overview on these and 
other contributions from behavioural science to tax, see H. Filipczyk, n. xx above, at 338 et seq. 
91 A survey of best practices can be found in OECD, Technologies for Better Tax Administration – A Practical 
Guide for Revenue Bodies, 2016; and OECD, Technology Tools to Tackle Tax Evasion and Tax Fraud, 2017. 
92 As it is the case in the UK, see R. de la Feria and P. Tanawong, “Surcharges and penalties in UK tax law” in R. 
Seer and A.L. Wilms (eds.), Surcharges and Penalties in Tax Law, EATLP International Tax Series, Vol 14 (IBFD, 
2016), 703-735 . The continued use of penalties and other traditional compliance methods, in conjunction with 
new behavioural science methods is common, see L. Lederman, “Tax Penalties as Instruments of Cooperative 
Tax Compliance Regimes” in ibid, 31-44, at 38-39. 
93 A tendency noted also by I. Lejeune et al, “Chronique Jurisprudentielle de la Cour de Justice” in C. Herbain 
(ed.), n. xx above, 34-95. See in particular cases: C-368/09, Pannon Gép Centrum, ECLI:EU:C:2010:441; 
C‑385/09, Nidera, ECLI:EU:C:2010:627; C-280/10, Polski Trawertyn, ECLI:EU:C:2012:107; C-263/11, Redlihs, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:497; C-284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458; C-527/11, Ablessio, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:168; C-259/12, Rodopi-M 91, ECLI:EU:C:2013:414; C‑563/12, BDV Hungary Trading, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:854; C-272/13, Equoland, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2091; C-337/13, Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:328; C-183/14, Salomie and Oltean, ECLI:EU:C:2015:454; C-516/14, Barlis 06, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:690; C-518/14, Senatex, ECLI:EU:C:2016:691; C-24/15, Plöckl, ECLI:EU:C:2016:791; C-564/15, 
Farkas, ECLI:EU:C:2017:302; C-624/15, Litdana, ECLI:EU:C:2017:389; C-101/16, Paper Consult, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:775; C-374/16, Geissel, ECLI:EU:C:2017:515. Similar trends can be detected in other areas of 
the tax system, see e.g. Cases C-431/08, FG Wilson (Engineering) and Caterpillar, ECLI:EU:C:2008:628, on 
customs duties; C‑497/15, Euro-Team, ECLI:EU:C:2017:229, on vehicle taxes; and C‑682/15, Berlioz Investment 
Fund, ECLI:EU:C:2016:94, on tax administrative cooperation. 
94 OJ C364, 18/12/2000, 1-22. See Case C-217/15, Orsi, ECLI:EU:C:2017:264. 
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Whilst behavioural science has provided new insights into tax compliance and the reasons behind tax 
evasion, 95  the traditional view stems largely from economics-of-crime theories according to which 
taxpayers weigh the expected benefits of tax evasion/crime with the uncertain prospect of detention and 
punishment.96 Under this view, audits, penalties, and other negative compliance incentives were not 
only effective anti-evasion methods, but indeed the only methods.97  Following this traditional approach, 
all EU Member States have been applying penalties and other negative compliance incentives for a 
long time, with the majority dividing these into two categories: civil penalties, applied to minor 
compliance offenses, and criminal penalties, applicable to tax evasion actions. 98  The last decade, 
however, has seen in many EU Member States a marked toughening of the penalties’ regime. 
As evident also in recent CJEU case-law, this toughening has been reflected not only in the number of 
penalties issued, and the level of penalty charged,99 but also in the diversity of penalties, which now 
include in some EU Member States not only financial charges, but the removal of tax rights, such as the 
right to deduct input VAT.100  Whilst penalty regimes are not harmonised at EU level, and Member 
States are therefore free to choose the penalties which seem most appropriate, the CJEU has 
consistently reiterated that this power must nevertheless be exercised in accordance with general 
principles of EU law, and in particular the principle of proportionality,101 as also now enshrined in Article 
49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  In order to comply with the principle of proportionality, 
penalties must therefore be regarded as suitable – appropriate for attain the stated aim – and necessary 
– they do not go beyond what is necessary to attain that aim.  The aim against which proportionality is 
to be assessed is the dual function which penalties, regardless of type, are perceived as having, namely 
a punitive function and a deterrence function.  Proportionate penalties are therefore those that are 
appropriate to punish and deter non-tax compliance, and which do not go beyond what is necessary to 
act as a punishment, but particularly as a deterrent.102 
                                                        
95 For a review of the various experiments done around the world using behavioural science to increase tax 
compliance, see J. Slemrod, “Tax Compliance and Enforcement: New Research and its Policy Implications” 
(2016) Ross School of Business Paper 1302. 
96 See J. Alm et al, “Why do people pay taxes?” (1992) Journal of Public Economics 48, 21-38, at 21-22. 
97 See M.G. Allingham and S. Sandmo, n. xx above; this deterrence effect of audits and penalties was empirically 
confirmed by J. Dubin and L. Wilde, “An empirical analysis of federal income tax auditing and compliance” (1988) 
National Tax Journal 41(1), 61-74; see also J. Slemrod and S. Yitzhaki, “n. xx above. 
98 For a detailed analysis of penalties applicable in EU Member States, Turkey, Israel and US, see R. Seer and 
A.L. Wilms (eds.), n. xx above, Chapters 12 to 31. 
99 Ibid. See also for developments in the UK, R. de la Feria and P. Tanawong, n. xx above, at 733 et seq. For 
developments in Germany, see R.T. Ainsworth, “German VAT Compliance – Moving One step Closer to 
Automated Third-Party Solutions” (2011) Boston University School of Law Working Paper 11-37; and J. Meyer-
Burrow and O. Stumm, “Recent Developments in German Criminal Law and their Impact on VAT Compliance” 
(2011) International VAT Monitor 3, 161. 
100 C-284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458. 
101 Cases 68/88, Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:339, at para 23; C-210/91, Commission v Greece, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:525, at para 19; C-210/94, Siesse, ECLI:EU:C:1995:351, at para 21. 
102  Cases C‑95/07 and C‑96/07, Ecotrade, ECLI:EU:C:2008:267, at paras 65-66; C‑263/11, Rēdlihs, ECLI: 
EU:C:2012:497, at paras 45-46; C‑284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458, at para 67; C-259/12, 
 Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law 18 
When evaluating whether the proportionality has been respected, the Court tends to concentrate on the 
second element of the proportionality test, namely whether the penalties in question are necessary or 
whether they go beyond what is necessary to deter fraud.  In this regard, Member States must consider 
inter alia the nature and the seriousness of the breach, and the amount of penalty,103 the correlation 
between the breach and the penalty imposed, 104  and whether there was actual revenue loss. 105 
Therefore Latvian penalties for failure to register, which are aimed at recovering the estimated amount 
of tax that would have been due had registration taken place;106 Hungarian penalties charged where no 
loss of revenue has occurred and there is no evidence of evasion,107 or where the error has been 
rectified;108 have all been deemed by the Court to be disproportionate.  Although the Court has not yet 
been called to decide on the proportionality of interest charged on unpaid tax,109 similar concerns have 
also been raised in this regard. As opposed to penalties, the purpose of tax interest is not to act as 
punishment or deterrence, but rather to neutralise the cash-flow advantage.  The expectation would be 
therefore that level of interest charged would be based on market rates, yet in many countries the level 
of tax interest has continuously edged away from market rates.110 
The Court has rarely, however, made reference to the suitability of penalties, the first element of the 
proportionality test.  Rather their suitability seems to be assumed, based on the traditional 
understanding as regards the effectiveness of penalties, and the sense that the higher the penalty the 
stronger the deterrence.111  Yet there is now empirical evidence that indicates that such effectiveness is 
far from guaranteed.  Even disregarding recent developments in behavioral economics, and when 
comparing traditional instruments to tackle tax fraud, namely penalties and audits, recent empirical 
research indicates that the risk of audit is a much stronger incentive to compliance than penalties;112 
highlighting the risk of penalty can be an effective means to increase compliance, but primarily on late 
compliers, rather than non-compliers.113 
Often unnecessarily burdensome, and with questions raised over its suitability, the toughening of the 
penalties, interest and other sanctions, is therefore difficult to equate in the context of deterrence or 
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even punishment of tax fraud, but much easier if seen in the context of revenue-gathering efficiency.  Its 
potential for additional revenue collection however is clear; audits may be a better deterrent, but the fact 
that they carry significantly more administrative costs, makes them less efficient.114 
Compliance Obligations and Formalism 
Although used in different contexts, legal formalism reflects a positivist theory of law. At the heart of 
legal formalism lies the view that decision making, or judicial adjudication, should follow the literal 
meaning of legal rules, autonomous from other reasoning, including their purpose.115 In tax law legal 
formalism is often discussed in the context of substantive tax rules and tax avoidance, as a formalistic 
approach facilitates manipulation of legal rules, and the granting of tax advantages where the letter of 
the law is complied with, even where its purpose is not.116  So that combating avoidance requires a non-
formalistic approach to the law. In this sense formalist is perceived as having the potential to undermine 
the tax system. 
Legal formalist in tax law has never been seen, however, from the perspective of adjective law, i.e. 
compliance rules.  In this sense too, formalism has the potential to undermine the tax system, but in this 
case, formalism is being used not by taxpayers, but by taxpayers as a tool to, allegedly, combat 
evasion.  The following cases concern instances of adoption of a formalistic interpretation of compliance 
rules by tax authorities, to justify the denial of rights where no evidence of fraud was presented or 
apparent. 
In Rusedespred the Court made it clear that principle of neutrality must be interpreted as precluding a 
tax authority from refusing the supplier of an exempt supply the refund of VAT invoiced in error to a 
customer on the ground that the supplier had not corrected the erroneous invoice, in circumstances 
where that authority had definitively refused the customer the right to deduct that VAT and such 
definitive refusal results in the system for correction provided for under national law no longer being 
applicable.  
In Petroma Transports it was held that the Directive and the principle of fiscal neutrality did not prevent 
the refusal of the right to deduct on basis of incorrect invoices, even if additional documents are 
supplied afterwards as proof. 
VSTR concerned the refusal to exempt intra-Union transactions on the ground of failure to produce the 
VAT identification number of the person acquiring the goods. While the Court accepted that the VAT 
identification number is usually necessary, it stated: “the grant of that exemption should not be refused 
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on the sole ground that that requirement was not fulfilled where the supplier, acting in good faith and 
having taken all the measures which can reasonably be required of him, is unable to provide that 
identification number but provides other information which is such as to demonstrate sufficiently that the 
person acquiring the goods is a taxable person acting as such in the transaction at issue”.117 This shows 
that even the presumption of VAT identification number is rebuttable. 
Diagram 3: Key CJEU Decisions on Compliance 
 
 
IV. TACKLING ORGANISED TAX FRAUD 
Whilst the links between tax fraud generally and other criminal activity, such as money laundering, have 
long been suspected,118 the links specifically between VAT fraud and organised crime are less well-
known.119 Yet, the risk of organised fraud, particularly through the use of fake invoices or supplies, is 
inherent to the invoice-credit VAT system,120 and the abolition of border controls within the EU, in the 
first instance, and later the digitalisation of the economy, have created the conditions for organised 
fraud to flourish.  This has occurred, not solely through the use of fake invoices, but crucially also 
through missing-trader fraud.  Whilst initially there was comparatively less academic attention dedicated 
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to VAT organised fraud, than to VAT evasion, EU Member States were quick to express concerns, 
given in particular the significant loss of revenue allegedly involved in this type of fraud. 
The institutional EU response to these concerns consisted initially of a two-fold conservative approach, 
namely: to intensify administrative cooperation and facilitate information exchange;121 and to expand the 
reverse-charge mechanism, particularly in specific industries susceptible to missing-trader fraud.122  
More recently, EU institutions have adopted, or suggested the adoption, of bolder approaches to 
tackling VAT organised fraud, in particular: the inclusion of serious cross-border VAT fraud within the 
remit of the new European Public Prosecutor Office;123 and the use of new technologies, such as data 
warehouses, electronic invoices, and licenced software.124 
Despite some of these more recent measures, the feedback from EU Member States indicated that 
traditional EU approaches to tackling organised fraud in particular were still lacking.125  From the early 
2000s onwards, therefore, a new trend starts emerging amongst EU Member States, with the adoption 
of new domestic legislation and administrative practices.  Like measures concerning penalties or 
formalistic approach to compliance adopted in the context of anti-evasion policy, these new measures 
were purportedly aimed at strengthening VAT anti-fraud policy in the context of organised fraud, yet 
they are not designed to tackle fraud per se, but rather to minimise its revenue costs.  Unsurprisingly, 
these measures have given rise to unprecedented levels of litigation, with those reaching the CJEU 
amounting to dozens.126  At the centre of litigation at CJEU level – necessarily a small fraction of total 
litigation within the EU –127 have been the legislative or administrative practices of only some Member 
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States, namely Austria, 128  Belgium, 129  Bulgaria, 130  Germany, 131  Hungary, 132  Netherlands, 133  and 
Poland,134 and the UK.135 The suspicion, however, is that similar practices are being adopted in many 
other EU Member States, but litigation is not reaching the CJEU;136 equally, there is evidence of similar 
practices being adopted in other countries, outside the EU.137 
What makes these cases so remarkable – and stands as evidence of the new approach to combating 
the revenue costs of fraud – is the fact that, in all but a few, the taxpayers involved in the litigation were 
not those allegedly committing the fraud, but a third person with some business connection to the 
presumed fraudster.  This third person could be the seller of the goods to the alleged fraudster, the 
purchaser of those goods, an intermediary, or even a warehouse keeper.  The phenomenon whereby 
private parties – not forming part of the criminal justice system – are legally, or administratively, held 
responsible for crime prevention, has been denominated responsibilisation, and is neither exclusive to 
VAT fraud, nor new.  On the contrary, the responsibilisation phenomenon (discussed below) has been 
identified as part of a general trend within crime control during the late 20th century,138 which has 
become widespread, in particular within financial crime, such as money laundering. 139   Why this 
phenomenon spread to VAT fraud and how it developed therein, can be understood by analysing the 
evolution of the CJEU case-law on organised VAT fraud. 
Development of the Principle of Third-Party Liability  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given that the responsibilisation phenomenon was first identified in the Anglo-
American context, the process of responsibilisation of third parties for VAT fraud seems to have started 
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–at least within the EU– in the UK.  In 2002, HMRC started refusing the deductibility of input VAT to 
traders where the purchaser of those goods had turned out to be a (missing trader) fraudster.  The 
general view is that – similarly to the rationale present in other countries –140 this new approach was 
financially motivated and linked to the difficulty in catching fraudsters, and the near impossible task of 
recovering the revenue lost to the fraud.141  Unsurprisingly, the new practice led to immediate litigation.  
Three cases, Optigen, Fulcrum and Bond House, were soon lodged before the UK courts,142 and whilst 
initially won by HMRC in the lower courts, they were referred to the CJEU on appeal. 
In Optigen, Fulcrum and Bond House HMRC sought to argue that, despite the taxpayers being unaware 
of the carousel fraud, the transactions did not constitute an economic activity for the purposes of VAT, 
within the meaning of the VAT Directive,143 and consequently did not give rise to the right to deduct 
input tax.  In its decision, the Court dismissed the argument. It rejected third-party liability, concluding 
that, in so far as the taxable person had no knowledge and no means of knowledge of the fraud, it 
should be allowed to deduct input VAT, regardless of the existence of prior or subsequent fraudulent 
VAT transactions in the supply chain.144 Particularly strong in its criticism of third-party VAT liability was 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro, who in his Opinion on the case stated: 
“The United Kingdom seems to envisage combating carousel fraud – or at least dispensing with 
the problems it poses – by limiting the scope of the VAT system. To my mind, the Court should not 
consent to this approach. It would drastically shift the burden of the problem from the tax 
authorities to the private sector, at the expense of legitimate trade and the proper functioning of 
the VAT system. Moreover, it would deter Member States from taking appropriate measures 
against carousel fraud.”145 
This initial rejection of third-party liability was significantly qualified less than a year later in Kittel and 
Recolta Recycling, with the introduction of the concept of innocence.146 Similarly to Optigen, Fulcrum 
and Bond, at stake was the limitation by the tax authorities, in this case Belgian, of the right to deduct 
input VAT of the acquirer of goods from a potential missing trader fraudster.  The Court appeared to 
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reiterate the decision in those cases, stating that innocent third parties cannot be made liable for VAT 
fraud; but it then went on to define innocent third parties as those that have not themselves committed 
the fraud, and have taken every precaution which could reasonably be required of them. A contrario, 
third-party liability for VAT fraud is possible where “the recipient tax payer knew, or should have known 
that the goods were connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT”.147  Ascertaining knowledge of fraud 
will be a proof matter, the expression “should have known”, however, raised immediate concerns as to 
its meaning and scope, even its translation, from the original judgment in French, has been 
questioned.148 
The scope of the expression was further developed by the Court a year later in Federation of 
Technological Industries.149   The Court started by confirming that third-party liability is possible, if 
principles of legal certainty and proportionality are met, but it can only be applied to persons who, at the 
time of the supply, knew or had reasonable grounds to suspect that some or all VAT would go unpaid. It 
then went on to set out the basic principles underpinning the burden of proof on third-party liability for 
fraud, by stating that a person is presumed to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that this is the 
case if the price paid was less than the lowest price that it might be reasonably expected to be paid for 
those goods in the free market, or less than the price paid on previous supplies of similar goods; this 
presumption is rebuttable, however, if proof is presented that the low price paid is attributable to other 
circumstances.  The decision was significant, not only for confirming the criteria for determining the 
potential liability o third parties for VAT fraud, but crucially also for establishing the basic principles 
underpinning the burden of proof on VAT fraud cases.  Henceforth the CJEU case-law on third-party 
liability for VAT fraud would be divided into two main streams, namely cases concerning the burden of 
proof for establishing liability, and cases concerning the scope of that liability. 
In terms of scope of that liability, all initial cases on third-party liability for fraud had concerned the 
removal of the right to deduct input VAT from a business who had acquired products from a fraudster. 
The first question then was whether that liability could be extended to removal of other rights, in 
particular the right to VAT exemption on intra-EU sales, when the acquirer of those products turns out to 
be a fraudster. Whilst the CJEU implicitly accepted the potential denial of those rights in the context of 
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organised VAT fraud soon after Federation of Technological Industries,150 express confirmation came 
only in 2012, in the Mecsek-Gabona case.151 
Whilst at the time this extension may have appeared as a small legal step, in reality it was an extremely 
significant one, substantively extending the scope of third-party liability for organised VAT fraud.  
Indeed, there are fundamental differences between making a business which acquired products from a 
fraudster liable, by denying the right to deduct input VAT, and making someone who supplied a good to 
a potential fraudster liable, by denying the right to exemption. Both instances constitute third-party 
liability for unknowing participation in organised VAT fraud, in the form of denial of rights, but there are 
key distinctions. Denying deductibility to the acquirer of goods constitutes the imposition of liability for a 
crime which has already occurred, committed in the same country that is now denying the right to 
deduct input VAT, not paid as output; on the contrary, denying the right to VAT exemption of intra-EU 
supply to the supplier of goods amounts to imposition of liability for a crime which has not yet occurred, 
and committed in another country, namely the Member State where the presumed fraudster was 
supposed to account for VAT on the intra-EU acquisition.152  Using the MTF example in Diagram 2, 
where B is the missing trader, imposing liability on A, or imposing liability on C, is not legally equivalent 
even though both amount to denial of rights.  The responsibilisation for a crime that has not yet 
occurred is not unique to VAT fraud, and can been seen as part of a wider shift to a pre-crime society, 
where crime is conceived essentially as risk or potential loss, and ordering practices are pre-emptive, as 
opposed to post hoc.153  
Insofar as the extraterritoriality element is concerned, the extension of the scope of third-party liability 
creates the opportunity for the imposition of double liability for a single crime, yielding double the 
revenue than the one lost to fraud: where both the supplier (A) and the acquirer (C) are made liable for 
fraud committed by a missing trader (B), through the denial of the right to VAT exemption on intra-EU 
supplies, and the denial of the right to deduct input VAT unpaid as output.  Instances of imposition of 
double liability for one instance of organised VAT fraud have already been reported in one Member 
State.154  A further element of extra-territoriality was added a year after Mecsek-Gabona, in Sunico,155 
which concerned the enforcement in the UK of third-party liability for VAT fraud on Danish residents, 
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where they had not perpetrated the fraud, even if allegedly benefiting from it.  The Court decided that 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, on enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,156 
could be interpreted as to include within its scope an action brought in by the tax authorities of one 
Member State, against residents of another Member State, for damages in respect of loss caused by a 
conspiracy to commit VAT fraud in the first Member State. 
As significant as these extensions had been, however, they still concerned the removal of rights.  The 
most recent debate regarding the scope of the third-party liability has been, therefore, whether it 
extends beyond organised VAT fraud, to VAT evasion, and from the possible removal of rights to 
include the imposition of obligations.  The first indication of the Court’s willingness to extend third-party 
liability to obligations in the context of VAT evasion came in 2011 with two key decisions that went 
almost unnoticed. The first decision in Jestel concerned an intermediary who had sold goods produced 
in China on eBay, in respect of which neither customs duties nor import VAT had been paid. Without 
referring to any previous decisions on third-party liability for VAT fraud, the CJEU ruled that an 
intermediary could be held liable for unpaid custom duties where he “was aware, or should reasonably 
have been aware”, that the introduction of the goods into EU territory was unlawful.157  Although the 
decision concerned customs duties, it raised the possibility that the Court would have decided in a 
similar manner had import VAT been at stake.158 The second significant decision came a month later.  
Vlaamse concerned the joint and several liability of a Belgian warehouse owner where the warehouse 
had been found to be used by a fraudster, in the context of organised VAT fraud. Whilst the CJEU 
denied liability on the case, the decision indicates a contrario, that liability would be possible had there 
been evidence of bad faith or negligence, therefore opening the door to the extension of third-party 
liability to the imposition of VAT obligations on intermediaries.159 
Seen in isolation these decisions seemed relatively inconsequential for wider case-law, but they paved 
the way for the Court’s landmark decision in Italmoda.160  That case concerned, at its core, the possible 
imposition of third-liability for VAT fraud, in the form of denial of rights, in the absence of national 
provisions allowing it.  The confirmation by the CJEU, that the liability for VAT fraud can indeed arise in 
the absence of national legislation providing for it, on the basis that this liability is inherent in the 
European legal system, 161  has significant theoretical and practical implications.  In essence, it 
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transformed third-party liability for VAT fraud from a rule, into a principle, as only a principle has the 
legal force to remove rights or grant liability in the absence of concrete rules.  Whether the Court 
regards third-party liability for fraud as an autonomous principle, a sub-principle of the principle of 
prohibition of abuse of law, or both as sub-principles of a wider principle, is unclear from the decision.162  
What is clear, however, is that a legal principle is capable of creating obligations, not just removing 
rights, and the emergence of third-party liability for fraud as a principle has natural consequences for its 
scope.163  Read in the context of the previous decisions in Jestel and Vlaamse, the scope of the new 
principle of third-party liability for tax fraud, as developed by the Court, appears to apply to any type of 
fraud, and to extend to the potential creation of VAT obligations to any member of the production chain, 
including intermediaries, such as warehouse owners or online retail platforms. 
As regards the burden of proof for establishing third-party liability for organised VAT fraud, in Teleos the 
CJEU set out the guiding principle, already implicit in Federation of Technological Industries namely 
that, whilst the onus of proof can be inverted in certain circumstances, such as the absence of market 
price, the onus generally rests with the tax authorities: the tax authorities must establish, on the basis of 
objective evidence, that the taxpayer concerned knew, or ought to have known, that fraud had been 
committed.164  This guiding principle is consistent with the Court’s previous case-law on burden of proof 
in the context of avoidance and evasion: whilst procedural tax rules are to a large extent determined at 
national level, the Court has set up limits to this autonomy insofar as the burden of proof is 
concerned,165 stating in particular that the onus of proof in cases concerning tax avoidance and tax 
evasion should rest with the tax authorities, and its reversal to the detriment of the taxpayer is a prima 
facie violation of EU law, and is only possible if the reversal fulfils the principle of proportionality.166 
Yet, despite its consistency, and the clarity of the principle, the Court has consistently asked in 
numerous cases to rule on the imposition of additional compliance obligations on taxpayers so as to 
prove their innocence,167 on whether different burden of proof rules applied to missing trader fraud and 
to bogus traders,168 and on whether the onus of proof could be inverted by general rules.169  In all cases 
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the Court sought to confirm that, notwithstanding exceptional circumstances where the onus of the proof 
had been inverted, no additional obligations could be placed on the taxpayer, except for the provision of 
a standard invoice and compliance with international accountancy standards, and that the same rules 
applied for both types of organised VAT fraud.  Yet, there is still evidence that some Member States are 
not applying even the guiding principle concerning the onus of proof, and placing the burden on 
taxpayers to prove that they did not know, and could not have known, that they were involved organised 
fraud.170  This stance is in contrast with Member States’ approach to burden of proof rules in the context 
of tax avoidance, where until recently they have been perceived as being broadly compliant with CJEU 
case-law.171  Diagram 4 offers a summary of existing case-law on burden of proof in cases concerning 
organised VAT fraud. 
Diagram 5: CJEU Jurisprudence on Burden of Proof 
 
Third-Party Liability as Aggravated Responsibilisation 
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The phenomenon of responsibilisation, emerged as a new mode of governing crime in the late 20th 
century.172  Prompted by a series of transformations in perceptions of crime, criminal justice structures, 
and a new realisation that the State could no longer assume sole responsibility for crime control,173 
Governments sought to act upon crime indirectly, by devolving responsibility for crime prevention to 
organisations and individuals outside the state, instead of directly through state agencies and 
organisations.  Once the new strategy was established, it became a case of identifying those private 
organisations and individuals who should have the responsibility to reduce crime opportunities 
effectively.174   Responsibilisation of the private sector within fraud and money laundering became 
commonplace,175 with financial institutions bearing the brunt of the responsibility,176 spreading then to 
other areas, such as cybercrime, with telecommunications and financial industries acquiring key roles in 
crime control.177 The extension to tax fraud was progressive, with some instances of responsibilisation 
dating back many years,178 and empirical evidence indicating that third-party information-reporting plays 
an important role in tax compliance.179 However, the development of the principle of third-party liability 
marks a new stage in both the acknowledgment,180 and the scope, of responsibilisation of the private 
sector in tax enforcement.181 This responsibilisation for tax enforcement, under the principle of third-
party liability, carries a key difference from other instances of responsibilisation: like in other areas, 
responsibilisation privatised crime control, but unlike under areas, it also privatised (some of) the costs 
of crime. Under the principle of third-party liability, businesses are required to carry out due diligence to 
ensure that their business partners are not involved in fraud – and as such, carry responsibility for crime 
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control.182 Where due diligence was not carried out, and the tax authorities present objective evidence 
that business should have known that fraud was being committed, those businesses lose the right to 
exercise their rights to a tax refund or tax exemption, and may be held liable for the tax that went 
unpaid; in this case, therefore, they carry the responsibility for the revenue costs of the fraud, which are 
transferred on to them through denial of tax rights, or imposition of new tax obligations.  This transfer 
imposes a detriment upon businesses which, whilst uncommon in the context of responsibilisation, is 
quite common within criminal justice systems through asset confiscation regimes. 
Asset confiscation regimes have existed in several countries for many years, but the same 
transformations which led to the development of responsibilisation in the late 20th century, also led to a 
renewed attention to these regimes, as the trend towards a “follow-the-money approach” in crime 
control settled in.183  Of particular relevance is the fact that new confiscation regimes allow various types 
of confiscation, including non-conviction based confiscation, also known as civil forfeiture or civil 
recovery, in which the confiscation of assets is pursued under civil proceedings, detached from criminal 
proceedings and regardless of their existence.  This type of confiscation regimes are usually justified on 
the basis of one or more of the following elements:184 (1) deterrence, by preventing the use of proceeds 
of crime;185 (2) prevention, by hindering re-investment; (3) restoration of the status quo, which would 
have existed if crime had not been committed; and (4) remedy, by compensating victims of crime 
conduct, or the State, for costs related to law enforcement.  Underlying these justifications, two key 
considerations are said to permeate the non-conviction based asset confiscation, namely: efficiency, 
sometimes also referred to as expediency, as potential higher costs and risks of criminal proceedings 
are avoided;186 and, a moral imperative, rather than a rational one, according to which no-one should 
benefit from their crimes. 187   Both justifications and underlying considerations assume that non-
conviction based asset confiscation targets criminal proceedings, thereby targeting crime in rem and 
ensuring a restitutionary effect.  Yet, insofar as the principle of third-party liability is concerned, it is not 
the proceeds of crime which are being targeted, and there is no restitutionary effect; rather a 
substitution effect, whereby the proceeds of crime – the revenue lost through fraud – is being collected 
                                                        
182 On the creation of a duty of due diligence, see B. Gunacker-Slawitsch, “The Knowing Participation in VAT 
Fraud: Reflections on the Contents and the Limits of a Reasonable Duty of Due Diligence” (2017) British Tax 
Review 5, 649-666. 
183  J. Boucht, The Limits of Asset Confiscation – On the Legitimacy of Extended Appropriation of Criminal 
Proceeds (Hart Publishing, 2017), at 5.  On the “follow-the-money approach” see also C. King and C. Walker, 
“Emerging Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets” in C. King and C. Walker (eds.), Dirty Assets 
– Emerging Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets (Routledge, 2014), 3-26, at 5. 
184 Ibid, at 10. 
185  Economic models seem to confirm this deterrence effect, under certain conditions, see R. Bowles et al, 
“Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains” (2000) International Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-
549.  Although there is limited evidence of it in practice, see J. Boucht, n. xx above, at 10. 
186 J. Boucht, n. xx above, at 10; and J. Hendry and C. King, “Expediency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law: A 
Systems Perspective on Civil / Criminal Procedural Hybrids” (2016) Criminal Law and Philosophy 10(33), 1-25, at 
10. 
187 M. Beare and F. Martens, “Policing Organised Crime – The Comparative Structures, Traditions, and Policies 
Within the United States and Canada” (1998) Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 14(4), 398-427, at 415. 
 Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law 31 
from a third-person.  In this context, most justifications and underlying considerations for asset 
confiscation do not apply: there is no moral imperative, since the crime was committed by a different 
person from that from whom the tax is being confiscated; and, for similar reason, there is no element of 
deterrence, prevention, or restoration of status quo.  There are, therefore, only two possible 
justifications for the existence of elements akin to asset confiscation in anti-tax fraud policy, namely 
remedy, to the extent that it allows compensation to the State for the revenue lost through fraud – 
although it does not compensate other victims of tax fraud, such as businesses who were put at a 
competitive disadvantage; and, efficiency, since it allows a quick recovery of the revenue lost through 
fraud, with minimal enforcement costs. 
The principle of third-party liability for tax fraud can therefore be characterised as an instance of 
responsibilisation, with aggravating elements which are more akin to asset confiscation.  Yet, even in 
their purer form, these criminal justice trends have been subject to intense scrutiny and their legitimacy 
questioned. Whilst non-conviction based asset confiscation is presented as recouping ill-gotten gains, in 
essence it operates as a sanction of criminal wrongdoing, 188 a paradigmatic example of the trend 
towards hybridisation procedures, which has been defined as the use of civil procedures to target 
criminal behaviour.189   Yet, the absence of civil procedures of the procedural protections that are 
present in criminal proceedings, has been said to threaten civil liberties, and the rule of law;190 as well 
as to create the risk of targeting legitimate possessions, with potentially stigmatising and reputational 
effects, and even adverse personal effects, on those who have been subject to asset confiscation.191  
Put in the context of the principle of third-party liability for tax fraud, these concerns are much more 
poignant because the features akin to non-conviction asset confiscation are applied in conjuction with 
responsibilisation. As a result the sanction is applied not to the wrongdoers – there is no presumption or 
pretence that the target are crime proceeds – but rather to a third-party, or more, who has not itself 
committed the crime; a crime which may have been committed extra-jurisdictionally, or which may even 
not have been committed yet. It is therefore those third-parties, not the wrongdoers, who will feel any 
potential stigmatising, reputational, or even personal negative effects resulting from the targeting of their 
property by tax authorities. 
 
V. FROM TAX FRAUD SUPPRESSION TO TAX FRAUD MANAGEMENT 
Anti-tax fraud measures, like other criminal law measures, have traditionally had a dual function, namely 
punishment and deterrence. The recent legal and administrative developments discussed above have 
cast doubts over their function. These above developments as regards tax fraud are reminiscent of 
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developments in criminal justice: a general move from crime control to crime management.  At present, 
anti-fraud policy is directed at managing the revenue costs of tax fraud, rather than at supressing or 
controlling tax fraud. Of course, in many situations, the two will coincide: measures aimed at addressing 
the revenue costs of fraud will have a positive effect in the reduction of the incidences of tax fraud itself. 
As demonstrated above, however, this will not be the case, or not necessarily the case, in many other 
situations. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The last decade has witnessed very significant developments in anti-tax fraud policy trends within 
Europe. Whilst many of these are positive developments, analysis of some of the characteristics of 
these trends unveils a fundamental lack of understanding of the phenomenon of tax fraud, and a 
consequently flawed approach to tax enforcement.  Public finance concerns, tax administration 
incentives, and the significant difficulties and costs entailed in combating tax fraud, have led to a shift in 
tax enforcement whereby tax fraud has been equated to revenue loss, and anti-fraud policy can no 
longer be regarded solely as a deterrent or as a form of punishment for tax fraud, but rather has 
become a compensatory measure for the revenue that has been lost through fraud.  Tax fraud has 
become a crime whose effects are to be managed, rather than a crime to be suppressed, and tax 
enforcement has come to be primarily driven by efficiency considerations. 
Equating revenue costs of fraud with fraud itself, and basing enforcement decisions on efficiency 
considerations only, however, has the potential to undermine the credibility of our legal system, 
representing a serious risk to the rule of law.  Efficiency, like neutrality and equity, is a key underlying 
principle of tax law, and as such it is appropriate that it should guide, in conjuction with the two other 
principles, tax policy design. A key distinction, however must be made between tax policy and tax 
enforcement: efficiency has a key role in first, but not in the latter; efficiency cannot, and must not, be 
the primary criterion applicable to tax enforcement decisions.  To do so, inevitably leads to selective tax 
enforcement, fatally undermining both neutrality and equity; it leads to further inefficiency, by 
discrediting the tax system and undermining compliance;192 and crucially, it undermines the rule of law, 
slowly corroding one of the core values upon which our society is based. 
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